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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the effects of the interaction between inflation
and the taxation of capital income. The principal conclusions are:
(1) Inflation substantially increases the total effective tax rate on
the income from capital used in the nonfinancial corporate sector.
The total effective tax rate has risen from less than 60 percent in
the mid—1960's to more than 70 percent in the late 1970's.
(2) The higher effective tax rate reduces the real net rate of return to
those who provide investment capital. In the late l97Os, the real
net rate of return averaged less than three percent.
(3) The interaction between inflation and existing tax rules contributed
to the fall in the ratio of share prices to real pretax earnings,
or, equivalently, to the rise in the real cost to the firm of equity
capital.
(4) By reducing the real net return to investors and by widening the
gap between the firms' cost of funds and the maximum return that they
can afford to pay, the interaction between tax rates and inflation
has depressed the rate of net investment in business fixed capital.
(5) The failure to consider correctly the effects of the fiscal structure
has caused observers to underestimate the expansionary character of
monetary policy in the past two decades.
(6) The goal of increasing investment while maintaining price stability
can be achieved with tight money, a high real interest rate, and
tax incentives for investment. A high real net—of—tax interest rate
could reduce residential investment and other forms of consumer
spending while the tax incentives offset the monetary effect for
investment in business capital.
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In the first three sections of this paper, I review some
of my own research on the impact of inflation on effective tax
rates, share prices, and nonresidential fixed investment. The
fourth section discusses how ignoring the fiscal structure of
the economy caused a misinterpretation of the tightness of
monetary policy in the 1960's and 1970's. The paper concludes
by commenting on the implications of this analysis for the
mix of monetary policy, fiscal policy and the tax structure.3
1.Inflation, Effective Tax Rates and Net Rates of Return
Our tax laws were written for an economy with little or
no inflation. With an inflation rate of six percent to eight
percent or more, the tax system functions very badly. The
problem is particularly acute for the taxation of income from
capital. Despite reductions in statutory rates over the past
two decades the effective tax rates on the income from savings
have actually increased sharply in recent years because infla-
tion creates fictitious income for the government to tax. Savers
must pay tax on not only their real income from savings but also
on their fictitious income as well.
Without legislative action or public debate, effective tax
rates on capital income of different types have been raised
dramatically in the last decade. This process of raising the
effective tax rate on capital income is hard for the public at
large or even for most members of Congress to understand. What
appear to be relatively low rates of tax on interest income, on
capital gains, and on corporate profits as measured under current
accounting rules are actually very high tax rates, in some cases
more than 100 percent, because our accounting definitions are
not suited to an economy with inflation.
As anyone with a savings account knows, even a 12 percent
interest rate was not enough last year to compensate a saver
for the loss in the purchasing power of his money that resulted
from the 13 percent inflation. The present tax rules ignore thistax return of minus 4.6 percent! The small
ized rather than rewarded for attempting to
The effect of inflation on
is no less dramatic. In a study
and Slemrod, 1978) ,JoelSlemrod
perience of a hypothetical investor
of securities like the Standard and
for twenty years and sold it in 1977.
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dividual tax returns reporting realized capital gains or losses
on corporate stock in 1973. While the sample is anonymous, it
is the kind of scientific sample that can be used to make accurate
estimates of national totals.
The results of this analysis were quite astounding. In
1973, individuals paid tax on $4.6 billion of capital gains on
corporate stock. When the costs of those securities are adjusted
for the increase in the price level since they were purchased,
that $4.6 billion capital gain is seen correctly as a loss of
nearly one billion dollars. Thus, people were paying tax on
$4.6 billion of capital gains when in reality they actually
sold stock that represented a loss of nearly a billion dollars.
Moreover, although people paid tax on artificial gains at every
income level, the problem was most severe for those investors
with incomes of less than $100,000.
While the lower capital gains tax rates that were enacted
in 1978 reduce the adverse effects of inflation, lowering the
tax rate does not alter the fact that people will continue to
pay taxes on nominal gains even when there are no real gains.
They now pay a lower tax on those gains but they still pay a
tax on what is really a loss.
Although interest recipients arid those who realize nominal
capital gains are taxed on fictitious inflation gains, by far
the most substantial effect of inflation on tax burdens is the
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found that the 1979 effective tax rate on the total real
capital income' of the nonfinancial corporate sector was 74
percent. Thus, taxes now take three—fourths of the total real
capital income on corporate capital. This represents a return
to the tax level of the mid—1950's before accelerated deprecia-
tion and the investment tax credit began reducing the total
tax burden. Even if attention is limited to Federal taxes,
our calculation shows that by 1979 the Federal government
taxes on corporations, their shareholders and their creditors
equaled 65 percent of the total real capital income of the
nonfinancial corporations net of the state and local taxes
paid by corporations.
The implication of a 74 percent total effective tax rate
on corporate income is clear. Since the real rate of return
on corporate capital before all taxes was 9.1 percent in 1979
(Feldstein and Poterba, 1980) ,thenet rate of return was only
about one—fourth of this, or 2.3 percent.
1This includes both economic profits and the return to
creditors.8
2.Inflation, Tax Rules and Share Prices
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1
A potentially important way in which inflation can alter
investment is by changing the cost to the firm
i.e., the ratio of share value per dollar of
In a smoothly functioning economy with no dis-
inflation should have no effect on the cost
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• causes a concurrent fall in the ratio of share prices
earnings. Although share prices then rise from thisat the higher rate of inflat
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tax credit. The corporation borrows b dollars
capital and pays interest at rate r. Since the
payments are deducted in calculating corporate
is taxed at the statutory rate t, the net cost
funds is (l-t)br. The net return to equity mv
of capital in the absence of inflation is (l-t1What happens to this net return when the inflation rate
rises? For simplicity, consider an instantaneous and unantici—
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method of inventory
t each percentage point
per unit of capital by
of depreciation and
inventories reduces net profits by tx per unit of capital.
When there is a positive rate of inflation, the firms'
net interest payments ((l-t)br) overstate the true cost to
the equity owners of the corporations' debt finance. Against
this apparent interest cost it is necessary to offset the re-
duction in the real value of the corporations' net monetary
liabilities. These net monetary liabilities per unit of capital
are the difference between the interest-bearing debt (b) and















s tori c 1
and the real value of taxable profits
cost of maintaining inventory levels i
that use the first-in/first-out (FIFO)
accounting. A linear approximation tha
of inflation increases taxable profits
Ximpliesthat the existing treatment11
Combining the basic net profits per unit of capital, the
extra tax caused by the existing depreciation and inventory
rules, and the real gain on net monetary liabilities yields
the real net return per unit of capital,
(1) z =(l—t1)f'
—(l—t)br—txi+(b—a)i.
The effect of inflation on the real net equity earnings per
unit of capital (z) depends on the response of the interest
rate Cr) to the inflation rate (1). In general, the change
in equity earnings per unit change in the inflation rate
(dz/di) depends on the tax and finance parameters and on the
effect of inflation on the interest rate (dr/di) according to:
(2) =—(l-t)b -tx+(b-a).
Econometric studies indicate that the nominal interest rate has




Thus,equity owners: (1)gain tb (per unit of capital) from a
risein inflation because nominal interest expenses are deducted
in calculating taxable income; (2) lose tx because of the under-
statement of cost due to the use of historic cost depreciation
and FIFO inventory accounting; and (3) lose a because they hold
non—interest bearing monetary assets.12
Recent values of these parameters imply that dz/di
is negative and therefore that inflation would reduce the
equity earnings per share.In 1977, nonfinancial corpora-
tions had a total capital stock of $1,684 billion and owed net
interest—bearing liabilities of $509.7 billion,1 implying that
b=0.302. The monetary assets of the NFCs had a value of $54.8
billion, implying that a=0.033. Since the corporate tax rate
in 1977 was t=0.48, these figures imply that dz/di=0.1l3-tx.
While it is difficult to calculate x as precisely as t, b
and z, it is clear that tx exceeds 0.113 and therefore that
dz/di is negative. Recall that xi is the overstatement of
taxable profits per dollar of capital caused by inflation at
rate i. Feldstein and Summers (1979) estimate that in 1977
inflation caused an overstatement of taxable profits of $54.3
billion of which $39.7 billion was due to low depreciation and
$14.6 was due to artificial inventory profits. Thus in 1977
xi=54.3/1684=O.032. The implied value of x depends on the rate
'The capital stock, valuedat replacement cost in 1977
dollars, is estimated by the Department of Commerce. The net
liabilities are based on information in the Flow of Funds tables.
Feldsteiri and Summers (1979) report the net interest—bearing
liabilities of NFCs as $595 billion. For the appropriate debt
measure in this work, the value of the net trade credit ($72.7
billion) and government securities ($12.9 billion) must be
subtracted from this $595 billion. The subtraction of net trade
credit reflects the assumption that the profits of NFCs include
an implicit interest return on the trade credit that they extend.
The new information is from the Federal Reserve Balance Sheets
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a weighted average o
maining capital was with greater weight given to
inflation in more re The consumer price index rose
6.8 percent in 1977, of 7.2 percent in the preceding
five years, and 4.5 1.9 percent in the two previous
five year periods.1 An inflation rate of 7.0 percent is there-
fore a reasonable upper bound
percent is a reasonable lower
that x=0.53 and therefore that
of i=0.07, x=0.46 and tx=0.22.
above the critical value of 0.
negative.
for the relevant rate and 5.0
bound. A value of i=0.06 implies
tx=0.256, even at the upper bound
Both of these values are clearly
113 required for dz/di to be
By itself, the fact that the inflation-tax interaction
•lowers the net of tax equity earnings tends to depress the
price—earnings ratio. This is reinforced by the fact that
nominal increase in the value of the corporation's capital
the
stock14
induces a capital gains tax liability for shareholders. But
the net effect on the share price level depends on the effect
of inflation on the investors' opportunity cost of investing
in stocks. Because households pay tax on nominal interest
income, inflation lowers the real net yield on bonds as an
alternative to share ownership. At the same time, the favorable
tax rules for investment in land, gold, owner—occupied housing,
etc. imply that the real net opportunity cost of shareholding
does not fall as much as the real net yield on bonds and may
actually rise.' In considering these interactions of inflation
and tax rules, it is important to distinguish households and
non—taxable institutions and to recognize that share prices
represent an equilibrium for these two groups.
In Feldstein (l980c), I evaluated the effect of inflation
on the equilibrium share price, using a very simple model with
two classes of investors. That analysis shows that if the
opportunity cost that households perceive remains unchanged
(at a real net—of—tax 4 percent) ,arise in the inflation rate
from zero to 6 percent would reduce the share value by 24 percent.2
A one—fourth fall in the households' opportunity cost of share
1This point is developed further in Feldstein (1978b, l980d)
and in Hendershott (1979), Hendershott and Hu (1979) and Poterba
(1980)
2Th• makes no allowance for the effect of the induced re-
duction of the capital stock on the subsequent pretax return.
Summers (1980) shows explicitly how that would reduce the fall
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tax effect but lie outside the scope of this paper.16
3.Inflation, Tax Rules andInvestment
Therate of business fixed investment in the United
States has fallen quite sharply since the mid-1960's. The
share of national income devoted to net nonresidential fixed
investment fell by more than one-third between the last half
of the 1960's and the decade of the 1970's: the ratio of
net fixed nonresidential investment to GNP averaged 0.040
from 1965 through 1969 but only 0.025 from 1970 through 1979.
The corresponding rate of growth of the nonresidential capital
stock declined by an even greater percentage: between 1965
and 1969, the annual rate of growth of the fixed nonresidential
capital stock averaged 5.5 percent; in the 1970's, this average
dropped to 3.2 percent.
An important reason for this decline has been the inter-
action of the high rate of inflation and the existing tax rules.
As the discussion in the previous two sections hasmade clear,
the nature of this interaction is complex and operates through
several different channels.I have investigated this effect in
Feldstein (1980a) by estimating three quite different models of
investment behavior. The strength of the empirical evidence
























The simplest and most direct way relates investment to
the real net return that the providers of capital can earn on
business capital. As I noted in section 1 of this paper, the
combined effects of original cost depreciation, the taxation of
nominal capital gains, and other tax rules raises the effective
tax rate paid on the capital income of the corporate sector and
thus lowers the real net rate of
pliers of capital can obtain on
This in turn reduces the incent









return that the ultimate sup-
nonresidential fixed investment.
lye to save anddistortsthe
nonresidentialinvestment.
the mechanism by wh
sions achieve this
during the past d
netrate of return.
ate of return varied around an
1950's, rose by the mid—1960's
percent for the 1960's as a whole,
en
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of GNP to the real net rate of return and to
zation) indicates that each percentage point rise
in the real net return raises the investment—GNP ra
one-half a percentage point. This estimated effect
robust with respect to changes in the specification
and method of estimation. It implies that the fallto more than one-
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net rate of return between the 1960's and the 1970'swas
enough to account for a drop of more than one percentage











though none of the three models is a "true" picture of reali
the fact that they all point to the same conclusion is reass
because it indicates that the finding is really "in the data
and is not merely an artifact of the model specification.
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to more than 12 percen
is perhaps not surprising therefore that the mone-
ties, other government officials, and many private
ave worried throughout this period that interest
be getting "too high". Critics of what was per-
ight money" argued that such high interest rates
investment and therefore depress aggregate demand.
all this it could be argued, and was argued, that
erest rate had obviously gone up much less. The
correct measure of the real interest rate is of course the20
difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of
inflation that is expected over the life of the bond. A
common rule of thumb approximates the expected future infla-
tion by the average inflation rate experienced during the
preceding three years. In 1964, when the Baa rate was 4.8
percent, this three—year rise in the GNP deflator averaged 1.6
percent; the implied real interest rate was thus 3.2 percent.
By the end of 1979, when the Baa rate was 12.0 percent, the
rise in the GNP deflator for the previous 3 years had increased
to 7.8 percent, implying a real interest rate of 4.2 percent.
Judged in this way, the cost of credit has also increased sig-
nificantly over the 15 year period.
All of this ignores the role of taxes. Since interest
expenses can be deducted by individuals and businesses in
calculating taxable income, the net—of—tax interest cost is very
much less than the interest rate itself. Indeed, since the
nominal interest expense can be deducted, the real net—of—tax
interest cost has actually varied inversely with the nominal
rate of interest. What appears to have been a rising interest
rate over the past 25 years was actually a sharply falling real
after—tax cost of funds. The failure to recognize the role of
taxes prevented the monetary authorities from seeing how ex-
pansionary monetary policy had become.
The implication of tax deductibility is seen most easily
inthecase of owner—occupied housing. A married couple with
a $30,000 taxable income now has a marginal federal income taxThe 11.4 percent mortgage rate in effect
of 1979 implied a net-of—tax cost of funds
ubtracting a 7.8 percent estimate of the
(based on a three year average increase, in
leaves a real net—of-tax cost of funds of
_____ Bycomparison, the 4.8 percent interest
rate for 1964 translates into a 3.0 percent net—of-tax rate
and 'a 1.4 percent real
the nominal interest ra
interest rate had also
net—of-tax real cost of
percent to a negative 0
As this example sh
into account is particu
are so non—neutral when
were completely indexed,
interest rate and of
completely different
last decade was expa
and others believed
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process have made the supply restrictions much
and have therefore made any interest level mor
than it otherwise would have been.
The low real after-tax rate of interest h
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$90billion a year, more than double the rate
1970's. More generally, as I noted in section
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Because individuals pay tax on nominal interest
















tion (Poterba, 1980) .Therewere, of course, times
ceilings on the interest rates that financial inst
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that the corresponding low real after—tax interest
ased the demand for funds. More recently, the raising
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income, theIt seems likely that this substantial fall in
on savings has contributed to the fall in the
rate and the rise in consumer demand.
The evidence summarized in the first section shows that
the analysis is more complex for corporate borrowers and in-
vestors because inflation changes the effective tax rate on
investments as well as the real net—of—tax interest rate.
Nore specifically, cost depreciation and
ventory accounting stantially the real af
on corporate investments, an easy—money policy
demand for corporate capital only if the real net
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lower real net return oninvestment depends onthe
debt—equity ratio and onthe relation betweenthe
hat must be paid on debtand on equity funds.It
t to say just what has happened on balance. In a
tudy, Lawrence Summers and I concluded that the
ominal interest rate caused by inflation was
htly less than the rise in the maximum nominal
rate that firms could afford to pay (Feldstein and
Summers, 1978). However, that study made no allowance for the
effect of inventory taxation or for the more complex effects











































My Current view, based on the evidence reviewed in section 3,
is that, on balance, expansionary monetary policy reduced the
demand for business investment at the same time that it increased
the demand for residential investment
It is useful to contrast the conc
with the conventional Keynesian analysis. A
traditional view, monetary expansion lowers
reduces the cost of funds
the accumulation of plant and
U.S. economy in recent years,
ways. First, a sustained mon
rates. Second, although the
net—of—tax cost of funds is 1
of funds produced in this way
and consumer durables (as well
rather than more investment in
because of the interaction of tax ru
expansion tends to discourage saving
plant and equipment. The low real n
on mortgages and consumer credit is
allocation of capital.
Perhaps the problems of misinterpretation and mismanagement
might have been avoided completely if the monetary authorities
and others in the financial community, as well as the Congress
est rate is higher, the
And, third, the lower
ages investment in hou
eater consumptio
and equipment.
les and inflation, a monetary
and reduce investment in
et—of—tax rate of interest
an indication of this mis—26
and the economics profession, had ignored interest rates com-
pletely and focused their attention on the money supply and
the credit aggregates. Presumably, under current Federal
Reserve procedures, there will be more of a tendency to do
just that. But since the temptation to look at rates as well
is very powerful, it is important to interpret the rates cor-
rectly. What matters for the household borrower or saver is
the real net—of—tax interest rate. A very low or negative real
net—of--tax rate is a clear signal of an incentive to overspend
on housing and on other forms of consumption. What matters
for the business firm is the difference between the real net—of—tax
cost of funds (including both debt and equity) and the maximum
return that, with existing tax laws, it can afford to pay. The
difficulty of measuring this difference should be a warning
against relying on any observed rates to judge the ease or
tightness of credit for business investment.27
5. The Mix of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
There is widespread agreement on two central goals for
macroeconomic policy: (1)achieving a level of aggregate demand
that avoids both unemployment and inflation, and (2)increasing
the share of national income that is devoted to business invest-
ment. Monetary and fiscal policy provide two instruments with
which to achieve these two goals. The conventional Keynesian
view of the economy has led to the prescription of easymoney
(to encourage investment) and a tight fiscal policy (to limit
demand and prevent inflation). Our low rate of investment and
high rate of inflation indicate that this approach has not
worked. It is useful to review both the way such a policy is
supposed to work and the reason why it fails.
Keynesian analysis, based on a theory developed during
and for the depression, is designed for an economy with sub-
stantial slack and essentially fixed prices. This Keynesian
perspective implies that real output can be expanded by increasing
demand and that the policy mix determines how this increased out-
put is divided between investment, consumption and government
spending. In this context, an increase in the money supply
favors investment while a fiscal expansion favors consumption
or government spending.
There is a way in which a policy mix of easy money and
fiscal tightness could in principle work in our relatively
fully—employed economy. The key requirement would be a per—28
sistent government surplus. Such a surplus would permit the
government to reduce the supply of outstanding government debt.
This in turn would induce households and institutions to sub-
stitute additional private bonds and stocks for the government
debt that was removed from their portfolios. The result would
be an increased rate of private capital accumulation. Under
likely conditions, this substitution of private capital for
government debt would require a lower rate of interest and a
relative increase in the stock of money.1
Unfortunately, the traditional prescription of easy money
and a tight fiscal position has failed in practice because of
the difficulty of achieving and maintaining a government
surplus.2 As a result, the pursuit of an easy money policy
has produced inflation. Although the inflationary increase in
the money supply did reduce the real after—tax cost of funds,
i-See Feldstein (1980b) for a theoretical analysis in which
this possibility is considered.
21t might be argued that the inflationary erosion of the
real government debt means that the government has in fact had
real surpluses even though nominal deficits. But such an inflation
adjustment also implies an equal reduction in private saving, in-
dicating that private saving has in fact been negative. The con-
ventional government deficit should also be augmented by the off-
budget borrowing and the growth of government unfunded obligations
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1 forms of res
and nonresidential investment, specific incentives for investment in
plant and equipment could more than offset the higher cost of
funds. The combination of the higher real net interest rate
and the targeted investment incentives would restrict housing
construction and the purchase of consumer durables while increasing
the flow of capital into new plant and equipment. Since housing and
ey policy and isca incentives
tight-money po icy ould preven
real net—of—tax rate of interest.





consumer durables now account for substantially more than half
of the private capital stock, such a restructuring of the in-
vestment mix could have a substantial favorable effect on the
stock of plant and equipment.
A rise in the overall saving rate would permit a greater
increase in business investment. The higher real net rate of
interest would probably induce such a higher rate of saving.
This could be supplemented by explicit fiscal policies that
reduced the tax rate on interest income and other income from
saving.
In short, restructuring macroeconomic policy to recognize
the importance of fiscal incentives and of the current inter-
action between tax rules and inflation provides a way of both
reducing the rate of inflation and increasing the growth of the
capital stock.Bibliogrp
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